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War’s Paradoxical Spaces
On the 19th of March 2011, NATO forces 
began a military intervention in Libya to implement 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. 
The Resolution demanded an ‘immediate ceasefire’ 
between Gadaffi’s forces and the ‘rebel’ uprising, and 
authorized the international community to establish 
a ‘no-fly zone’ and to use all means necessary - except 
foreign occupation - to protect civilians. With Gadaffi 
gone, both Libyans and the international community 
had great reason to celebrate. With the help of NATO, 
the rebels - now the ‘National Transitional Council of 
Libya’ - were able to overthrow a vicious forty-year 
dictatorship. By October 2011 Operation Unified 
Protector was over. There was no U.S. president pro-
claiming victory in front of a big banner, but there 
was an overwhelming sense that this time things were 
different: there were no lies about WMD that didn’t 
exist and the mission had U.N. backing; it was the 
perfect war because it was for someone and something 
else. Maybe this time it really was ‘mission accom-
plished’?
But what exactly was the purpose of the inter-
vention in Libya? Wars and their causes are always 
overdetermined, but I pose this question because the 
central figure of this paper - the civilian - has a spectral 
presence in Operation Unified Protector. According 
to Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper at the time, 
‘Avoiding civilian casualties was main Libya objective’. 
In a press conference in September 2011, Canadian 
air force Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, and 
the man in charge of NATO operations in Libya 
assured NATO members and journalists that: “We 
are not there to kill civilians, we were there to protect 
civilians” and admitted that civilian loss of life per-
sonally affected him. But what perturbed Bouchard 
most was that NATO - and not only Gadaffi - was 
responsible for such losses: “[a]ny time there was a 
civilian death and we caused it, it got to me,” (Koring 
2011, emphasis added). Such remarks and headlines 
reveal the intervention in Libya as a paradoxical sort 
of war: a war where the primary purpose was not to 
kill the enemy but to spare civilians, but in order to 
do so entailed the killing of some other civilians. If it 
sounds confusing that’s because it is. Yet in Libya, and 
indeed in all so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’, 
the civilian has become both the ends and means of 
late-modern war. Saving civilians has become the very 
intentional and deliberate goal of military action, but 
when it comes to killing them, the action is always 
deemed a collateral consequence of something Higher 
and more Moral. In a classical biopolitical formulation 
we arrive at a situation where saving civilians requires 
killing them, and in-turn killing them requires saving 
them. 
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In other civilian news, the U.S. policy of targeted 
assassination (also known in less loaded terms as 
‘targeted killing’) has been ramped up and intensified 
over the last few years, especially under the Obama 
administration. The ‘capture or kill’ list now includes 
U.S. citizens, people born in the U.S. and with U.S. 
passports, as well as that of its allies, including British 
and German citizens. The killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi 
in Yemen in September 2011, proved particularly 
controversial precisely because he was a U.S. citizen. 
It is one thing to kill foreigners in the war on terror, 
but quite another to execute citizens of one’s own 
nation1. True, they are not killed on U.S. soil (not yet 
anyway), but it nonetheless feels a little closer to home 
when it is Americans and not Others of the marginal 
global borderlands being killed. Yet the precedent 
which normalised the summary execution of U.S. 
citizens has a much longer history and we should 
not forget that the first ever targeted-killing strike in 
Yemen, back in 2002, also killed a U.S. citizen, 29 
year old Kamal Derwish (Vann 2002). Nevertheless, 
the policy has come a long way since then and the hit 
list has seemingly been expanded yet again. It wasn’t 
just Anwar al-Aulaqi that was killed in Yemen’s al-Jawf 
province that autumn; just two weeks later, Abdul-
rahman Al-Aulaqi along with his cousin and eight 
other ‘al-Qaeda militants’ were ‘liquidated’ by a drone 
missile. In defence of the attack “U.S. officials” (they 
never have names), claimed that the son had associa-
tions with al-Qaeda and in response to claims that he 
was a minor, insisted that Abdulrahman was a 21 year 
old adult. A week later the al-Aulaqi family released 
his Colorado birth certificate. He was just sixteen 
years old. No evidence has been given as to his in-
volvement and role in al-Qaeda. 
Deliberate Killing?
Civilians, forsaken, obliterated - or saved - are 
much in the news, and they have been for a long time. 
Ever since the early 19th Century, when the term 
‘civilian’ began to denote a non-combatant, newspa-
pers were blotted with the blood of the civilian. Today 
1  This seems to be the approach taken by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) who have focused much of their 
efforts on the Al-Aulaqu case. 
a Google search for “civilian” returns nearly 12 million 
articles, whereas “dead civilian” generates 21 million. 
But while civilian suffering is not new, its historic and 
geographic contours and conditions, its discourse 
and practice, are constantly changing. In this paper 
I attempt to draw-out some of these changes, and to 
highlight the different ways in which the civilian has 
been apprehended in three contemporary texts on the 
subject of civilians in war. The civilian is both an idea 
and a reality and the conceptualization of the relation-
ship between the two affects how we may think and 
act toward civilians in the 21st Century. The three 
books I would like to draw from are Helen Kinsel-
la’s (2011), The Image before the Weapon; Hugo Slim’s 
(2007) Killing Civilians and Steven J. Rockel & Rick 
Halpern’s (eds.) (2009), Inventing Collateral Damage. 
Reading these three texts against each other then, I 
comment on what is at stake in contemporary ap-
proaches to questions of the civilian.
If the three books agree on one thing, it is that 
civilian deaths  have been a constant feature of the 
landscape of war. The two monographs and the edited 
collection take different approaches to what Slim calls 
the “civilian question”. The historical trajectories and 
geographical composition of each text are excitingly 
diverse and often imaginative. Kinsella takes us back 
to the 11th Century and the Medieval period, dem-
onstrating a radical indeterminacy of the distinction 
between civilians and combatants, an indetermi-
nacy which “will always result in violations”2 (p.189, 
emphasis in original). Slim begins with a massacre in 
Bakedu (Liberia) in 1990 but does not stay there very 
long; he offers a rich polka-dot history and geography 
of civilian suffering, drawing on his experience as a 
humanitarian for Save the Children and the U.N.. 
Rockel & Halpern start their history in the 18th 
Century, though they foreground Empire - ‘Civilian 
2  A similar argument is put forward by 
Patrica Owens: “From the bombings of Serb residential 
neighbourhoods, bridges and hospitals to the destruction of 
Afghan refugee convoys, a series of dramatic and well-publicised 
events in recent military campaigns have come to be labelled 
‘accidents’. Political and military leaders have sought to ensure 
that all non-combatants who die in the course of these so-called 
‘humanitarian wars’6 are portrayed as doing so ‘accidentally’.” 
(Owens 2003: p. 596)
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Casualties, War and Empire’ is the subtitle - and argue 
that collateral damage had its antecedents and prec-
edents in the colonial encounter, and even before as 
Gregg (chapter 7) shows. Although in one way or 
another all three books are about the civilian, their 
focus is different: Kinsella is interested primarily in the 
legal dimensions of the civilian, Rockel and Halpern 
in the politics of naming and euphemism while Slim 
concentrates on the moral dimensions of where, how 
and why civilians suffer in war.  
Of all the texts, Slim offers perhaps the most 
gruesome account of civilian deaths in war; he writes 
about the charred bodies, raped women and systemic 
massacres that mark the norms of war. What is more, 
he is convinced that such “anti civilian” thinking and 
behaviour is quite deliberate: “Some commentators 
speak today as if civilian suffering or the intentional 
killing of civilian populations is a novelty. But this is 
very far from the truth” (p.3). From one time-place 
to another he presents case after case of the various 
ways in which civilians suffer and die in war. It is an 
ambitious book because as well as documenting and 
describing such atrocities, Slim also tries to account 
for why civilians are targeted, why people are drawn 
to kill the innocent and how they are mobilized - by 
the state and  the ‘individual psyche’ - to do so. These 
are all very complex questions, not least because as I 
noted above, war is necessarily overdetermined. Yet as 
devastating as his interrogative account is, Slim retains 
a resolutely optimistic humanism and in the closing 
chapter he enquires: “How can we convince people 
that there are such things as civilians in war and that 
deliberately killing and harming them is wrong?” 
(p.251).
The answer is not straightforward of course, and 
it is compounded by what Slim refers to as “civilian 
ambiguity” (the title of chapter 5), the idea that it is 
often difficult to tell civilians and combatants apart. 
Civilian ambiguity is a point of agreement between 
Kinsella and Slim, though they draw radically 
divergent conclusions from it. But while Slim recog-
nises the difficulty of distinguishing between civilians 
and combatants, he implies that such ambiguities are 
ultimately, if not easily, resolvable. He argues that “if 
the civilian idea is as strong as it is ancient, it should 
somehow be able to come through such a discussion 
[on civilian ambiguity] intact.” (p.188) But isn’t the 
‘problem of the civilian’ precisely it fragility, and not 
its strength? The civilian, never intact in the first place, 
is unlikely to emerge with any more clarity in contem-
porary debates about civilian status. But how is Slim 
able to maintain that the civilian is at the same time 
both fragile and intact? Does this not contradict his 
own argument?
Slim recounts how in his discussions of today’s 
wars, people have challenged him by asking “what is 
a civilian?” This is the crucial question, I think, and 
it frames Kinsella’s whole account. But Slim goes on 
to claim that “people find this question much harder 
to answer in the heat of actual war that in academic 
seminars and the meeting rooms of humanitarian 
agencies” (p.182). The implication is that the civilian 
question is resolvable in theory; that it is possible to tell 
apart, legally, philosophically and rationally, civilians 
from combatants. The problem of ambiguity arises, 
according to Slim, only when the irrationality of war 
gets in the way of good reasoning;  the civilian idea 
therefore fails only in moments of “extremis” (p.183). 
For Slim, therefore, the civilian is not an ontologi-
cal question, but a problem made and unmade by 
political will; i.e. the problem is one of compliance.
Zones of Indistinction
This simplistic resolution of the civilian question is 
precisely what Kinsella agitates against. Slim assumes 
that the principle of distinction rests on a categorical 
difference between combatant and civilian, whereas, as 
Kinsella would argue, it is the distinction that produces 
the difference (p.6). Kinsella notes how the study of 
international law and international relations is con-
sistently restricted to the study of the dimensions of 
compliance, a “framing [that] excludes an analysis of 
the very politics that informs and produces interna-
tional institutions and creates international order” (p. 
5-6). The focus on compliance, however, presumes 
that “which the atrocities of conflict so brutally belie 
– that the combatant and civilian are coherent and de-
terminant categories” (p.5). So it is in theory and in law 
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- and not just the ‘fog of war’ - that the categories must not 
be taken as self evident. This is not to say that civilians 
and combatants do not exist, but that their existence 
is a production: “the significance and strength of the 
categories of combatant and civilian are provisional 
and, as such, must be consistently reiterated to ensure 
their status and grant them sanctity.” (p.5). 
Kinsella’s argument is important for two reasons. 
First, in noting that the principle of distinction lays 
at the heart of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL), and yet paradoxically also signals its most 
“radial crisis”, she invites the reader to consider that 
the edifice of Law and Reason rest upon shaky foun-
dations. Normatively, ethically and politically this 
matters because “[...] indeterminacy will always result 
in violations.” (p.189). Second, Kinsella problema-
tizes the categories of the civilian and combatant by 
examining the discourses that produce and sustain 
them. She shows how the taken-for-granted categories 
have been imbued with power, politics and ideology, 
shaped by particular gendered and imperial institu-
tions and interests. It is on gender and imperialism 
that Kinsella really offers something new, shattering 
both the canon of international law and it’s conven-
tional histories.
Image before the weapon is a genealogy of the 
concept of distinction. Using Foucault’s concept of 
a series - the relationships among three discourses - 
Kinsella traces how discourses of gender, innocence 
and civilization (the title of the first chapter) “like 
red threads, mark the history of the principle of dis-
tinction” (p.7). For Kinsella, these discourses have 
been deployed to secure notions of a civilized - pre-
dominantly Christian European - ‘us’, distinguished 
from a barbaric, necessarily ‘guilty’ subhuman ‘them’. 
Beginning her genealogy with an analysis of piety, 
mercy, honour and chivalry in the Middle Ages, 
Kinsella demonstrates that the conventional histories 
of international law (including those by canonical 
authors such as Theodor Meron; Michael Walzer and 
James Turner Johnson) are wrong to harbour nostal-
gias about these ideas from the past. She argues that 
the legacy of chivalry entailed soldiers acting in a civi-
lizing (i.e. often brutal) manner - against non-Chris-
tian pagans - rather than actually acting in a civilized 
manner. She also shows how Empire was legitimated 
through the language of law, and therefore contrib-
utes to a healthy, but by no means dominant, post-
colonial critique of international law (see Angie 2007; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Koskenniemi 2004; 
Orford 2006; Douzinas 2007). In chapter three, for 
example, she recounts the terrifying violence of The 
Requirement, a legal document read by the Spanish 
Conquistadores to those who were about to be 
colonized, giving them the ‘choice’ to surrender (and 
become slaves) or fight (and probably die). The power 
of the law in this passage terrifies, even today. 
But this is not only a post-colonial critique of in-
ternational law. Kinsella also brings gender into the 
fold. She argues, for example, that the granting of 
mercy historically (and always tied up with notions of 
modern-day ‘restraint’) is inseparable from the asym-
metric power relationship resulting from the sovereign 
right to adjudicate  on matters of life and death. He 
who shows mercy is civilized, exercising a capacity 
for judgement (and therefore reason and politics), 
whereas the subject who is granted pardon is passive 
and innocent. More often than not the innocent 
are constructed through a gendered lens, hence the 
common phrase and resulting outrage when ‘woman 
and children are among the casualties’. Whereas some 
children grow into men though, the sex of women 
is fixed in the history of war and the figure of the 
innocent woman is a barometer against which the 
civility of nations can be judged. Yet to be “innocent” 
is not, if you will, innocent, because as Kinsella points 
out in an earlier essay:
“To be innocent in war, in the terms set 
by the laws of war, is to be deficient or lacking 
in a multitude of ways that in the end, im-
plicitly if not explicitly, cites an incapacity for 
politics [...] Equally significant, an incapacity 
for politics is also, at least for Aristotle, an in-
capacity to become fully human. This is not 
benign, for it shows how the rights and pro-
tections of international humanitarian law are 
genealogically derived or grounded in what 
some might call `subhumanity’. What this 
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portends is that international humanitarian 
law requires and produces “subhumanity” as 
the predicate for extending recognition of its 
rights or offering its protections. Insofar as 
this is true, then international humanitarian 
law must also promulgate particular under-
standings of what it is to be “barbarian” and 
to be “woman,” continually citing their inca-
pacity to be fully constituted as human and as 
political.’” (2006, p.185)
Therefore, holding onto the idea that women 
are somehow outside of war and should be spared is 
less about ‘doing good’ (Mahrouse 2010) and ‘saving 
women’ (Jiwani 2010) than it is about securing 
a masculine civilized identity. Of course, this has 
resonance in today’s debates about the co-option of 
feminism - or a particular kind of feminism - by the 
state to salvage the “abject status of the oppressed 
Muslim woman, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or in 
their nearest immigrant ghetto” (Thobani 2010, p. 
128). The point, however, is that gender, innocence 
and sex (and sex difference) also produce the feminised, 
vulnerable figure of the civilian (or Muslim woman). 
The civilian was once she who could not carry a weapon 
(as Grotius claimed), but today it is she who through 
her very body, in all its child-bearing capacity, and cen-
trality to the nuclear family cannot participate in war. 
Of course, this is challenged by the undeniable and 
widespread participation of women in war through-
out the ages, but something very clever happens in 
the history of the laws of war to disguise this fact and 
produce a female innocence. The participation of “[w]
omen in war disrupt[s] the order of things” (p. 80); it 
is both unusual, but in a crucial sense it is also criminal 
in that it deviates from the ‘natural’ comportment of 
women. This is how it becomes possible to kill women 
- and we must face the fact that women suffer, often 
more brutally and in very different ways to men in 
war - while still maintaining that ‘we’ are civilized. 
For as we find in Grotius: “a women does not take 
the name of the enemy for “in so far as women play 
the part of men they are men and not women”. He 
concludes, “if women are guilty, then it will be that 
the guilt is destroyed rather than woman.” (quoted in 
Kinsella, p.80). Gendered innocence - in the form of 
an incapacity for war but also an inability for politics 
- therefore forms the pivotal identity of the civilian. 
The good and true civilian is the feminine figure par 
excellence; she who literally cannot fight and must nec-
essarily be spared. 
Kinsella’s analysis complicates and adds nuance 
to Slim’s narrative. She takes international law and its 
categories seriously and therefore achieves something 
that Slim cannot. Kinsella is brilliant because she traces 
the ways in which the combatant and the civilian gain 
traction and definition through one another. Histori-
cally, all kinds of reasoning has been found to turn 
ostensible civilians into legitimate targets; we saw this 
in aerial bombing campaigns of World War Two and 
we witness it today in Gaza and elsewhere. Appar-
ently civilians hardly ever die because the discourses 
of humanity do not apply to the enemy. Thus rather 
than deliberately killing civilians, it is perhaps more 
productive to think about the ways in which civilians 
become non-civilians even before the commencement 
of battle. This speaks to what Derek Gregory (2006) 
has called the ‘death of the civilian’. The destruc-
tion of the notion of their civilian precedes but also 
crucially produces the death and obliteration of real 
people, and this is the crucial link that Slim misses 
when he separates theory from practice and war from 
law. When Kinsella encourages us to think about the 
discourses which produce the civilian as an idea, she at 
the same time provokes us to consider its unmaking on 
the battlefield; that moment when civilians turn into 
combatants (see Weizman 2009; Jones 2010).
Euphemism
The debate about collateral damage (that is inci-
dental and accidental as opposed to intentional death 
and damage) brings us to the final text, Inventing 
Collateral Damage. Historians Stephen J. Rockel and 
Rick Halpern have put together an impressive collec-
tion of essays, the product of a conference, ‘Collateral 
Damage: Civilian Casualties from Antiquity through 
the Gulf War’ held at the University of Toronto in 
2004. While Historians make up most of the contrib-
utors there are some offerings from outside of the dis-
cipline; Smita Tewari Jassal (Anthropology), Micheal 
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Pesek (African Studies), Timothy Brook (Chinese 
Studies) and Marc Herold (Economics and Women 
Studies). There is much here that should pique Ge-
ographers’ interests, for as Jassal insists, “Historicizing 
our understanding of collateral damage is a necessary 
step in tracing the evolution of the concept and in re-
covering the layered meanings of the term in different 
contexts” (p.261). In the same way that Kinsella relin-
quishes “the comfort of preconceived categories” (p.7) 
the edited collection strives to problematize the ways 
in which collateral damage functions to produce a 
politics which excuses civilian death. There is no epis-
temological consensus, and a genuine interest in the 
histories of collateral damage brings forth an impres-
sive array of approaches, all of which are grounded 
firmly in empirical and archival research. In this way, 
the comparative historical studies that form the basis 
of the book help to reveal the multiple geographies of 
war and its attendant collateral. The appeal to radical 
geographers is manifold; the attention to race, gender 
(especially Marlene Epp, Chapter 4) and colonialism 
create a remarkably sensitive reading of wars multiple 
valences of violence. 
The collection makes many important contri-
butions to the various literatures on civilian casual-
ties in war. Chief among them is the argument that 
the suffering of civilians is a constant feature of the 
landscape of war. This might not sound novel, es-
pecially in light of Slim and Kinsella’s analysis, but 
what is missing from these other works is a grounded 
empirical sense of how war has progressed (or not). 
Inventing Collateral Damage agitates against a dominant 
narrative among political scientists and historians that 
warfare is somehow getting better. Enter the language 
of technological-mastery and the so-called Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA). According to this narrative, 
the twentieth-century wars saw a massive increase in 
civilian casualties, World War Two being the superla-
tive, from when casualties decreased dramatically and 
have virtually vanished in our ‘clean wars’ today. With 
the exception of today’s terrorists and totalitarians, 
war is no longer about inflicting maximal suffering 
upon the enemy. Rather, wars - or more accurately 
‘our’ wars (Gregory 2011) - are about security and the 
mitigation of risk and suffering so that life (or at least 
some life) may flourish (Dillon and Reid 2008).
It is unsurprising that of any of the contributions 
it was Mark Herold’s chapter (chapter 13), ‘”Smarter” 
U.S. weapons kill more innocents’ that sparked con-
troversy among supporters of the wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. You’ll have to read the book to find out 
exactly what happened but suffice it to say that National 
Public Radio (alongside others) were outraged by 
Herold’s approach to civilian casualties and the sta-
tistics he presents. What follows is a stunning, and 
painfully contemporary statistical analysis of civilian 
deaths and the use of precision weapons. The idea of 
precision weapons as the “immaculate conception to 
warfare” (Col. Mackubin Owens, quoted on p. 303) 
is blown apart as it is revealed that “The greater the 
share of precision weapons employed, the higher the 
rate of civilian casualties” (p. 303). Herold’s chapter 
disarms contemporary commentators like Human 
Rights Watch’s Marc Garlasco who stated in 2008 that 
he had “not seen a single incident of civilian casual-
ties in Afghanistan” (quoted in Herold and Peterson 
2008: 2). One wonders which war Garlasco had been 
following.
Yet while Rockel is surely correct in his assertion 
“that all the great ideas about humanity at peace or at 
war did not apply to black (or brown) people [...they] 
were not seen as making up peoples or nations” (pp. 22), 
these sentiments were also not limited to the colony. 
We must go back to what Foucault (2003: p. 103) 
called the ‘boomerang effect’, to think about the ways 
in which the political and legal technologies exported 
by Europe to its colonies  were also ‘brought back to 
the West’, resembling an ‘internal colonialism’. Thus, 
for example, were such notions that Rockel summaris-
es not already applicable in the metropole given what 
happened, for example, to the Commune in 1871 or 
in the Spanish Civil War? How could they forget the 
Spanish Civil War? Much violence was meted out on 
civilians as regular government or government-or-
chestrated violence, such as pogroms against Jews in 
late 19th and early 20th century, the mass murders of 
Romanies since the 17th century (see Thorpe 2010), 
and the assassination of working class leaders. The 
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problem of race and collateral damage are not limited 
to the relationship between Europe and its external 
others; it also has much to do with internal othering 
and the very making of “Europe” - and indeed the 
West - itself. But this is why we must also go beyond 
Foucault’s boomerang effect to consider the West/
Other binary as far more complex space of interaction 
than Foucault himself had imagined. Boomerangs 
don’t always return when they are thrown; they get 
lost, or are picked up and thrown by somebody else. 
It might make more sense to think of the relationship 
between the West/Other as more resembling a series 
of what Jean and Jean Comaroff (2006: 8) describe as 
“complex north-south collaborations”. 
The post-colony, the colony, the colonizer and the 
colonised are contained in each other, and today it is 
difficult to discern exactly where certain technologies 
came from. Perhaps it easier is to envision the direction 
they are going, and I’m thinking here of a series of 
terrifying events and precedents, including the as-
sassination of Juan Charles De Menezes in London 
in 2007; the  U.S. National Defence Authorization 
Act (NDAA) 2012, which sanctions the indefinite 
detention of U.S. citizens whether they are at home 
or abroad (in effect extending Guantanamo into the 
heart of the ‘American homeland’) (see U.S. Congress 
20123), the banning of face-covering Muslim veils 
including the niqāb and burqa in France in 2010, 
not to mention the forthcoming London Olympics, 
hailed as the UK’s ‘biggest mobilisation of military and 
security forces since the second world war’ (Graham 
2012). Thus while it is impossible to be exhaustive it 
does seem that the absence of such analysis of warfare 
within what became “Europe”, together with the lack 
of attention paid to how these technologies travelled 
between Europe and its colonies, reflects a major 
weakness in the edited volume. 
One final - but no less critical - oversight of the 
edited collection, which applies equally to Slim’s book, 
is that it fails to consider the legal dimensions of col-
lateral damage. By failing to take seriously the inter-
national legal regimes which regulate armed conflict 
(IHL), the authors are unable to push the invention 
3  The relevant sections are: 1031 and 1032
of collateral damage to its maximal conclusion. Col-
lateral damage was not only invented because the 
violence done to the colonies suddenly become too 
difficult to justify at the moment “serious claims were 
made to national sovereignty” (Rockel, p. 49). It was 
also invented to ensure that the continuation of such 
violence could proceed under the banner of the law: 
for it is precisely through the law, with all its techni-
calities, provisions and exceptions, that the language 
of collateral damage survives as a legitimate and legiti-
mizing euphemism today.
The Judicialization of War 
In this final section, and by way of conclusion, I 
would like to pick up on this last point regarding the 
relationship between law, war and legitimacy. In their 
introduction to Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, 
John and Jean Comaroff (2006) argue that everyday 
life is becoming increasingly judicialized. Further-
more, they claim politics itself has “migrated to the 
courts”, shrouding itself in “culture of legality” where 
“[c]onflicts once joined in parliaments, by means 
of street protests, mass demonstrations, and media 
campaigns, through labor strikes, boycotts, blockades, 
and other instruments of assertion, tend more and 
more—if not only, or in just the same way every-
where—to find their way to the judiciary”. (p. 26-7). 
The parallels between politics and war are many - as 
Foucault (2003) showed us in Society Must be Defended 
- if not always perfect. Yet I wonder whether we are not 
witnessing, alongside the “judicialization of politics” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 26), a corresponding 
judicialization of war? 
Let it be clear that I am not suggesting that war 
is becoming more legal, or that the proliferation of 
legal discourses taking war as their object make war 
somehow better, more moral or humane. Formal law 
and legal judgement are accompanied by a rhetori-
cal performance which wraps politics and war in a 
“skein of lawfulness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006: 
38). The power of law often lies elsewhere, in what 
Jaques Derrida called its “mystical foundations” and 
what Walter Benjamin saw as its intrinsic “violence”; 
the ability of law to both make and preserve, but also 
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conceal itself. What matters is not whether this war, or 
that strike is legal or illegal - for these are ‘mere’ tech-
nicalities - but how questions of legality are perceived. 
Surely this is the meaning of the phrase ‘justice must 
be seen to be done’, where the emphasis is on the seeing 
rather than the doing per se. Law has an audience; it 
speaks to an addressee, and in late-modern war the 
field of perception has been expanded to include a 
multiplicity of publics, both at home and abroad (see 
Smith 2006; Gregory  2011). Thus it is not so much 
that war and its politics are ‘migrating to the court’, as 
Comaroff and Comaroff would have it, but that the 
courts are in-fact migrating elsewhere, into the very 
spaces and ontologies of war, (re)signifying and (re)
presenting it as they do. This is the so-called ‘era of 
lawfare’ (Goldstein and Meyer 2011), but it marks not 
so much a departure from the past, but an intensifica-
tion; the use of law as a weapon of war - ‘divine’ and 
‘natural’ law - is as old as war itself. 
In order to understand the relevance of all this, 
let us return to where we began. In very different 
ways, and for very different reasons, the interven-
tion in Libya and the U.S. targeted killing policy are 
saturated in legal questions. One of them is a classic 
‘humanitarian intervention’, the other has proven a 
little more difficult to justify in strictly humanitarian 
terms and is scripted rather as a central component of 
the global war on terror (Savage 2012). Yet inasmuch 
as the drone policy is about eliminating terrorism in 
a bid for global security, it bears a significant similar-
ity to the classic humanitarian war. Both are about 
eliminating one population in order to save another. 
The problem is that these biopolitical lines difficult 
to draw. Libya qualifies for intervention, Syria and 
Bahrain do not. At what point do such decisions 
become ‘costly’ for global security? Similarly, counter-
terrorist operations in Pakistan are said to be ‘working’ 
(whatever that means) but are also known to attract 
widespread condemnation and even antipathy from 
locals and political leaders. One wonders what dif-
ference it makes, from the vantage point of s/he who 
is being bombed, whether the drone strike that kills 
them, or the humanitarian intervention that (fails) to 
save them is legal or not. 
And yet it does matter, though not because it 
makes it any more right or wrong, moral or immoral, 
but precisely because it does not. While the lines 
between those who shall be saved and those who shall 
be forsaken in today’s global humanitarian wars are in-
creasingly difficult to draw, the one that proves - para-
doxically - so easy and yet simultaneously absolutely 
impossible to draw is that between the civilian and the 
combatant. We must, therefore, treat with a special 
kind of skepticism the war whose purpose it is to save 
the civilian. Yet equally important is that we afford 
the same skepticism to any claim about the distinc-
tion between legal, legitimate combatant targets and 
illegal, illegitimate civilian targets. 
Was Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, that 16 year son of 
a wanted man, a legitimate military target? Was he a 
civilian, or was he a combatant? Perhaps we’ll never 
know, or maybe we simply cannot know, for the dis-
tinction between the two is never stable and is con-
stantly re-made by those with the power to define. 
Abdulrahman’s death marks the ultimate indistinction 
that lies at the heart of this thing we call the civilian, 
and yet to his grandfather, Nasser al-Aulaqu there is 
nothing ambiguous it: “I urge the American people to 
bring the killers to justice. I urge them to expose the 
hypocrisy of the 2009 Nobel Prize laureate. To some, 
he may be that. To me and my family, he is nothing 
more than a child killer.”4 In the space of war that is 
becoming what Derek Gregory (2011 )has called the 
‘everywhere war’, a president’s target to be destroyed is 
another’s grandson, lover, parent or friend. 
But there is one other kind of intervention that 
we must look toward in order witness how the law-
legitimacy amalgam completes the forsaking of the 
civilian, and this - of course - is Kosovo. The NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is important because 
it set a very peculiar precedent; it was and still is widely 
believed by the worlds’ leading international legal 
scholars to be both  illegal and legitimate. But how is 
an unlawful war possibly legitimate? Surely if it was 
legitimate is should also be legal? This is precisely what 
lawyers like Theodor Meron () argued. The law lagged 
4  http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2097899,00.html
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behind, but is it only a matter of time before it catches 
up to the realities we are told are so radically different 
and new from anything that came before. Legitimacy 
wags the dog of law. Libya was legal, but not necessar-
ily legitimate. The drone policy over Pakistan, Yemen 
and elsewhere is questionably legal and questionably 
legitimate. The terrible thing about the international 
law which frames these conflicts is that it progresses 
through transgressions, or to use Benjamin’s terms, it 
preserves law by making law. When they are seen to 
be legitimate, illegal wars soon become legal, and for 
the battered, bruised and forsaken civilian ‘legal wars’ 
must be every bit as terrifying as ‘illegal ones’. 
References
Anghie, A., 2007. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law, Cambridge University 
Press.
Benjamin, W., 1978. Critique of violence. Reflec-
tions, 14(3), pp.277–300.
Comaroff, J. & Comaroff, J.L. eds., 2006. Law 
and Disorder in the Postcolony, University Of Chicago 
Press.
Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M. & Carlson, D.G. 
eds., 1992. Force of Law: ‘Mystical Foundation of 
Authority’. In Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice. Abington: Routledge, pp. 3–67.
Dillon, M. & Reid, J.D.M., 2009. The Liberal Way 
of War: Killing to Make Life Live, Taylor & Francis.
Douzinas, C., 2007. Human Rights and Empire: 
The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Taylor & 
Francis.
Finn, T. & Browning, N., 2011. An American 
Teenager in Yemen: Paying for the Sins of His Father? 
Time. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2097899,00.html [Accessed May 2, 
2012].
Foucault, M., 2003. ‘Society Must Be Defended’: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 First ed., 
New York: Picador.
Goldstein, B.M. & Meyer, A.E., 2011. Lawfare: 
The War Against Free Speech: A First Amendment Guide 
for Reporting in an Age of Islamist Lawfare, CreateSpace.
Graham, S., 2010. Cities Under Siege: The New 
Military Urbanism 1st ed., Verso.
Graham, S., 2012. Olympics 2012 security: 
welcome to lockdown London. The Guardian. 
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2012/
mar/12/london-olympics-security-lockdown-london 
[Accessed April 30, 2012].
Graham, S., 2009. The Urban ‘Battlespace’. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 26(7-8), pp.278 –288.
Gregory, D., 2006. The death of the civilian. En-
vironment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24(5), 
pp.633–638.
Gregory, Derek, 2011a. From a View to a Kill 
Drones and Late Modern War. Theory, Culture & 
Society, 28(7-8), pp.188–215.
Gregory, Derek, 2011b. The everywhere war. The 
Geographical Journal, 177(3), pp.238–250.
Herold, M. and D. Peterson. 2008. Civilian Ca-
sualties Do Not Exist for a (likely) War Criminal: 
Bombs Away Marc Garlasco, February 20, paper 
available at:http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/
CivilianDeaddonotExistGarlascoFeb202008.pdf, 
accessed May 1 2011
Jiwani, Y., 2010. Doubling Discourses and 
the veiled Other: Mediations of race and gender 
in Canadian media. In S. Razack, M. Smith, & S. 
Thobani, eds. States of Race: Critical Race Feminism for 
the 21st Century. Between the Lines.
112 Human Geography
ForsakinG tHe Civilian
Jones, C., 2011. Shooting Gaza: Israel’s Visual 
War. Human Geography, 4(1).
Kinsella, H. M, 2006. Gendering Grotius. Political 
theory, 34(2), pp.161–191.
Kinsella, Helen M., 2011. The Image Before the 
Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between 
Combatant and Civilian, Cornell University Press.
Koring, P., 2011. Avoiding civilian casualties was 
main Libya objective, Canadian general says. Globe 
and Mail. Available at: http://license.icopyright.net/
user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=MTYxMjAyMDg%3D 
[Accessed May 2, 2012].
Koskenniemi, M., 2004. The Gentle Civilizer of 
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-
1960, Cambridge University Press.
Mahrouse, G., 2010. Questioning efforts that 
seek to ‘do good’: Insights from transnational solidar-
ity activism and socially responsible tourism. In S. 
Razack, M. Smith, & S. Thobani, eds. States of Race: 
Critical Race Feminism for the 21st Century. Between 
the Lines, pp. 169–190.
Orford, A., 2006. International Law And Its 
Others, Cambridge University Press.
Owens, P., 2003. Accidents Don’t Just Happen: 
The Liberal Politics of High-Technology `Humanitar-
ian’ War. Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 
32(3), pp.595 –616.
Parks, H., Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, 
and Legally Incorrect “,(2010). NYUJ Int’l L. & Pol., 
42, p.815.
Rockel, S.J. & Halpern, R. eds., 2009. Inventing 
Collateral Damage: Civilian Casualties, War, and 
Empire First ed., Between the Lines.
Savage, C., 2012. Obama’s Top Counterterrorism 
Adviser Defends Drone Strikes. The New York Times. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/
world/obamas-counterterrorism-aide-defends-drone-
strikes.html [Accessed May 2, 2012].
Slim, H., 2010. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, 
and Morality in War, Columbia University Press.
Smith, R., 2007. The Utility of Force: The Art of 
War in the Modern World 1ST ed., Knopf.
Stark, H., 2011. Germany Limits Informa-
tion Exchange with US Intelligence. Spiegel Online. 
Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,762873,00.html [Accessed April 29, 
2012].
Thobani, S., 2010. White innocence, Western 
supremacy: The role of Western feminism in the ‘“War 
on Terror”’. In S. Razack, M. Smith, & S. Thobani, 
eds. States of Race: Critical Race Feminism for the 21st 
Century. Between the Lines.
Vann, B., 2002. White House defends CIA killing 
of US citizen in Yemen. Available at: http://www.
wsws.org/articles/2002/nov2002/yem-n12.shtml 
[Accessed May 1, 2012].
Weizman, E., 2010. Legislative Attack. Theory, 
Culture & Society, 27(6), pp.11–32.
